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Abstract: This essay argues that Speech-Language Pathology (SLP) emerged as a 
response to the early twentieth-century demand for docile, efficient, and thus 
productive speech. As the capacity of speech became more central to the industrial and 
democratic operations of modern society, an apparatus was needed to bring speech 
under the fold of biopower. Beyond simple economic productivity, the importance of 
SLP lies in opening the speaking subject up to management and normalization—
creating, in short, biopolitical subjects of communication. We argue that SLP accordingly 
emerged not as a discreet institution, but as a set of practices which can be clustered 
under three headings: calculating deviance, disciplining the tongue, and speaking the 
truth of pathologized subjects.  
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The therapeutic industry of Speech-Language Pathology (SLP) has become the dominant 
mode of approaching speech variation. The way we understand voices that stray 
beyond codified linguistic and temporal boundaries is widely assumed to be medical 
and scientific, not political. Part of this depoliticization stems from the fact that expert 
knowledges of speech disability have gone uncontested. This paper thus traces the 
emergence of SLP in the early twentieth century and argues that it be read alongside the 
increasing centrality of communicative networks within modern society and the need 
for a corresponding apparatus to govern speech. We suggest, building on and 
supplementing the recent work on dysfluency within critical disability studies,1 that a 
critical history is required to excavate the pervasive but nevertheless ableist imperative 
to normalize dysfluent voices. This imperative not only oppresses disabled people by 
                                                   
1  E.g. Joshua St. Pierre, “Cripping Communication: Speech, Disability, and Exclusion in Liberal 
Humanist and Posthumanist Discourse,” Communication Theory 25, issue 2 (2015): 330-348; 1–21; Jay 
Timothy Dolmage, Disability Rhetoric (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2013); Kevin 
Paterson, “It’s About Time!: Understanding the Experience of Speech Impairment,” in Routledge 
Handbook of Disability Studies, eds. Nick Watson, Alan Roulstone, and Carol Thomas (New York: 
Routledge, 2012); Christopher Eagle, ed., Literature, Speech Disorders, and Disability: Talking Normal 
(New York: Routledge, 2013).  
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contorting their bodies and selves according to dominant norms of communication but 
constrains the possibilities of dysfluent subjects to participate meaningfully in social and 
political spaces,2 and does so in order to make communicative bodies manageable and 
productive in an ever more streamlined and rational communicative society. How and 
why have we arrived at this present? What effects does pathologizing and 
instrumentalizing communication have on individual dysfluent speakers? And perhaps 
most importantly: how might we rethink such communicative practices?  
We argue that the emergence of speech correction in the early twentieth century 
be understood as an operation of “biopower”—Michel Foucault’s concept of the 
normalization and governance of populations. As speech became more central to the 
civic and capitalist operations of the U.S., an apparatus (dispositif) was needed to make 
the capacity of speech more manageable, efficient, and thus productive. Speech 
correction is accordingly best conceived not as a discrete institution, but as an 
overlapping set of practices that both free the circulation of speech within society and 
integrate disabled speakers into the productive flows of communication. These practices 
can be clustered under three headings. First, speech correction produced a norm of good 
speech by calculating deviance across the population. This norm was shaped in relation to 
nationalistic, socio-economic, and eugenic anxieties. Second, speech correction disciplined 
individual speaking bodies to approximate the norm. The political utility of normalizing 
speech lay not simply in making bodies productive, but in making them docile and able 
to interface with streamlined and bureaucratic communicative networks. Third, speech 
correction internalized these disciplinary practices within pathologized subjects by 
claiming scientific legitimacy and speaking the truth of these selves. Through technologies 
of self-normalization, dysfluent speakers bound themselves to a pathologized identity of 
being a “speech defective” and thus came under the discursive power of speech 
correction. These technologies of power render speech correction a seemingly necessary 
response to the problem of unruly speech.  
The official story of SLP3 however, goes something like this.4 At the beginning of 
the twentieth century, and particularly after WWI, an altruistic realization of the need 
for speech correction swept across society. In the U.S., the general and progressive 
interest in speech education within the academy was slowly turned towards the issue of 
speech defects and correction until, in 1925, the American Academy of Speech 
Correction (now AHSA: the American Speech-Language-Hearing Association) was 
founded. Distinct from the nineteenth-century “charlatans and quacks”5 who preyed on 
                                                   
2  Cf. Stacy Clifford Simplican, The Capacity Contract: Intellectual Disability and the Question of 
Citizenship (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2015). 
 
3  We take ‘SLP’ and ‘speech correction’ to be more-or-less interchangeable, but try as much as 
possible not to use ‘SLP’ anachronistically. 
4  Cf. Marcel E. Wingate, Stuttering: A Short History of a Curious Disorder (Westport, CT: Bergin 
& Garvey, 1997). 
5  G. Oscar Russell, “Section on Elementary, Popular, and Semi-Popular Articles,” Journal of 
Speech Disorders 6, issue 1 (1941): 39-40. 
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the troubles of speech defectives, offering a quick fix for a price, modern speech 
correction was a distinctly scientific institution. There were of course many schools and 
internal debates. Some, for example, thought stuttering was primarily medical6 or linked 
with brain laterality;7 others believed stuttering and its treatment were under the 
domain of psychiatry;8 while still others saw stuttering primarily as a psychological 
habit encrusted over an organic deficit.9 Each presumed cause had a corresponding and 
often divergent treatment. Nevertheless, guided by scientific progress and philanthropic 
aims, speech correction flourished in the 30s and 40s, gaining recognition as a credible, 
authoritative, and much needed scientific practice. 
There is nothing untrue about this story, yet its truth conceals as much as it 
reveals. Existing histories of SLP often resort to empty abstractions that have no causal 
force in their effort to tell a distinctly progressive narrative.10 Speech pathologist and 
historian Margaret Eldridge, for example, speaks of “a growing [social] awareness of the 
need” for speech correction.11 What exactly is this need? Why did it arise? Others within 
the field like Marcel E. Wingate describe a history of ideas wherein SLP primarily 
develops in relation to progress in psychology, anthropology, linguistics, and 
medicine.12 While somewhat more descriptive, this focus on conceptual advances cannot 
show the specific mechanisms that drive history forward. The official story is, in short, a 
fluent history, an (ableist) abstraction that smooths over the normalizing practices and 
biopolitical imperatives from which modern speech correction was born. The danger of 
fluent histories is that they reify such abstractions. They naturalize the ways that we 
relate to dysfluency: as if “aphasia” or “stuttering” were given, transhistorical objects; as 
if speech correction were the rational social response to non-normative forms of 
communication. 
A “critical history”13 or “genealogy”14 is accordingly needed to show how fluent 
speaking bodies and the apparatus of speech correction are the products of history, a 
history that could have been otherwise. This is a trip down the back-alleys of SLP 
                                                   
6  Robert West, Diagnosis of Disorders of Speech: A Clinical Manual of Methods and Apparatus (Madison, 
WI: College Typing Company, 1936). 
7  Edward Lee Travis, Speech Pathology: A Dynamic Neurological Treatment of Normal Speech and Speech 
Deviations (NY: D. Appleton Co., 1931). 
8  E.g. Smiley Blanton, “Stammering and the Voice Teacher,” Public Speaking Review 4 (1914): 74-81. 
9  Wendell Johnson, People in Quandaries: The Semantics of Personal Adjustment (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1946); Charles Van Riper, Speech Correction: Principles and Methods, First Edition (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939). 
10  One notable exception is Judith Duchan, whose work we will return to below. 
11  Margaret Eldridge, A History of the Treatment of Speech Disorders (London: E. & S. Livingston 
Ltd., 1968),110; Charles Van Riper, C. 1974. “Stuttering: Where and Whither?” ASHA September 
(1974): 483.  
12  Wingate, Stuttering. 
13  Nikolas Rose, Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
14  Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in The Essential Foucault, eds. Paul 
Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (New York: The New Press, 2003), 351-369. 
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history. Genealogies outline not the continuities of history, but those “historically-
contingent practices, encounters, events, and accidents [that] have enabled the 
emergence of current modes of thinking and acting and the limits that they impose.”15 A 
genealogy maps networks of power and is thus interested neither with origins and 
universals, nor precisely with the goals or intentions of individual agents. Rather, it 
traces specific historical practices and their rippling and often unintended effects. As 
Foucault aptly states: “People know what they do; they frequently know why they do 
what they do; but what they don't know is what what they do does.”16 The attention to 
how rather than why we act and think allows us to consider what in history is necessary 
and what could have been otherwise.  
In this way, Foucault’s technique of genealogy has proven itself immensely 
useful in the field of disability studies. Shelley Tremain’s landmark piece “On the 
Government of Disability” (2001) suggests that the agenda for critical disability studies 
should be to:  
 
articulate the ways that disability has been naturalized as impairment by identifying the 
constitutive mechanisms of truth and knowledge within scientific and social discourses, 
policy, and medico-legal practice that have produced that contingent discursive object and 
continue to amplify its regulatory effects.17 
 
 Subsequent work in disability studies by, for example, Licia Carlson,18 Jane Berger,19 
and Xuan-Thuy Nguyen20 has taken up this genealogical challenge of identifying the 
historically contingent ways that disability as an object of knowledge and curative 
intervention is produced. Our paper follows in this trajectory. Until quite recently, 
speech disabilities have been absent from the analysis of disability, and focusing on the 
specific practices, or what Foucault terms technologies of power21 used to produce 
rational and productive speech patterns can, as Nikolas Rose argues, help us “think 
about our nature and our limits, about the conditions under which that which we take 
                                                   
15  Shelley Tremain, “This Is What a Historicist and Relativist Feminist Philosophy of Disability 
Looks Like,” Foucault Studies 19 (2015): 13. 
16  Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1982), 187. 
17  Tremain, “On the Government of Disability,” Social Theory and Practice 27. 4 (October 2001): 
635. 
18  Carlson, “Docile Bodies, Docile Minds: Foucauldian Reflections on Mental Retardation,” in 
Foucault and the Government of Disability, edited by Shelley Tremain, first edition (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2004), 133-152.  
19  Berger, “Uncommon Schools: Institutionalizing Deafness in Early-Nineteenth-Century 
America,” in Foucault and the Government of Disability, 153-171. 
20  Nguyen, “Genealogies of Disability in Global Governance: A Foucauldian Critique of 
Disability and Development,” Foucault Studies 19 (June 2015): 67-83 
21  Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” in Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel 
Foucault, eds. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1988), 16-49. 
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for truth and reality has been established.”22 “Denaturalizing” the pathologization of 
speech production reveals that our values about communication, particularly clear and 
fluent communication, have a history and an ignoble one at that. Critical history allows 
us to question that which seems necessary and rethink, perhaps quite radically, why and 
how we communicate. 
A genealogy is necessarily specific, and we will accordingly contain our focus to 
the emergence of SLP in the U.S., which develops in relation to yet is distinct from such 
contexts as Canada, the UK, the Continent, and beyond. We do not, moreover, suppose 
this to be a complete genealogy. Our analysis covers the early years of SLP, up until the 
early 1940s, and intends to show the founding trajectory of SLP as a biopolitical 
institution and regime of truth. Further work is needed to trace SLP though its middle 
period (1940-70s) into the present, yet we suggest that while transformed in significant 
ways, technologies of calculating deviance, disciplining the tongue, and speaking the 
truth instituted in the early twentieth century remain at the center of this regime of 
truth.  
Further work is also needed to broaden the scope of analysis. In the interest of 
specificity, our critical history will pay particular attention to the management of 
stuttering: a useful lens since this particular speech disability received a 
disproportionate amount of attention within the early years of SLP. To take a snapshot, 
during the first thirty years of AHSA records (1926-1957), there were three times as 
many conference papers given on stuttering and five times as many articles published 
on stuttering than the average for the other ten categories of “speech defects,” including 
aphasia, articulation disorders, cerebral palsy, and cleft palate.23 Professional records 
were not kept before this time, but Eldridge notes that “as early as 1893 a survey of 
speech handicapped children was made in Boston, Massachusetts; of these 78 percent 
were classified as stutterers.”24 While stuttering cannot be elided with other forms of 
speech disability, its treatment during the birth of speech correction provides a clear 
case study of speech correction’s early goals and practices.  
 
Speech Anxieties 
 
One cannot consider the formation of speech correction as an essential 
“apparatus” (a network of power and knowledge) of the modern state without a sense 
of the social role speech had come to play in the early twentieth century. Speech was no 
longer a skill perfected by the political, industrial, and religious elite, but was becoming 
a productive capacity central to American democratic and industrial society. Speech was 
necessary for normal psychological and intellectual development and was understood 
as the “greatest weapon of [man’s] brain in the fight for advancement.”25 Changes in 
                                                   
22  Rose, Inventing, 41. 
23  Wingate, Stuttering, 89. 
24  Ibid., 76. 
25  Frederick Martin, “Stammering,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 5, issue 3 (1919): 287. 
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industry and technology rendered speech an important economic capacity. Democratic 
citizens were (presumably) ruled not by silent obedience but through civic participation. 
A productive, articulate citizenry required efficient speakers. Yet while managing 
American speech was a newly minted obligation, there were seemingly more speech 
defectives than ever. “Even the man in the street,” lamented an anonymous editorialist 
in 1919,  
 
is conscious now that thousands in our midst are untouched by our American spirit because 
they cannot communicate with us; and that thousands, yes, tens of thousands, more are 
unable to play their full part as citizens and workers in the industrial democracy because they 
cannot talk.26  
 
In short, the U.S. had a speech problem. 
 Starting in the 1820s, lyceums and Chautauquas had affirmed clear, useful, and 
aesthetically pleasing speech as correct, as public, and in turn, as American.27 As the 
social function of speech became even more prominent in the early twentieth century, 
divergent forms of speech threatened national unity and identity.28 Moreover, while 
foreigners with speech defects were often denied immigration due to their likelihood of 
becoming a public charge,29 speech experts worked to assimilate the accents of those 
who did immigrate.30 Foreign accents were measured alongside other speech defects, 
and acquiring an American accent was a mark of citizenship and moral standing:  
 
                                                   
26  E.M.H, “Editorial: The Speech Campaign. An Item for Explanation,” The English Journal 8, 
issue 7 (1919): 436. 
27  Cf. Angela G. Ray, The Lyceum and Public Culture in the Nineteenth-century United States (East 
Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2005). 
28  National fears, exacerbated by immigration, were shifting from invasion to infiltration 
(McWhorter 2009) and in this context, pure, unified, and distinctly American speech was often 
defined in contrast to the speech of immigrants and African Americans. For example, Claudia E. 
Crumpton, an educator and the secretary for the National Speech Association, blames much of her 
district’s “most embarrassing deficiency of speech” on “the influence of negro dialect, to the imitation 
of the negro just for fun, and to the children’s imitation of the nurse’s speech” (Claudia E. Crumpton, 
“Speech Betterment in Alabama,” The English Journal 6, issue 2 (1917): 96. The role of the speech 
correctionist here was not to purify the speech of black Americans, but to contain the spread of such 
speech to unsuspecting white children.  
29  Marion T. Bennett, American Immigration Policies: A History (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs 
Press, 1963), 339; Scripture, Stuttering, 2.   
30  It is worth noting that while ASHA stresses that accents are not speech and language 
disorders (ASHA 2015), a caveat that in itself raises a myriad of historical questions, they continue to 
accept “accent modification” as being within SLP’s scope of practice.   
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The very Americanization of the foreign citizen is involved in this matter of clear English 
speech. A good speech, unhampered by accent, is a requisite for the highest mental and 
moral development of the immigrant.31  
 
Race and class form an indispensable part of the history of American speech correction, 
evident in the host of speech “experts” who emerged to adjudicate which speech 
patterns were the most fitting standard for the nation to embody, with the continued 
aim of protecting pure speech from the harms of laziness and infection by foreigners, 
racialized Americans, and speech defects alike. 
In response to these manifold threats of deviant speech, speech clinics were 
established under the disciplinary umbrellas of medicine and education, and school 
curriculums increasingly emphasized spoken and “good” English. In 1896 G. Hudson 
Makuen founded the Philadelphia Polyclinic Hospital, the first recorded clinic for 
speech defects, and by 1920 many more clinics had been established in the east and 
midwest, not to mention in many parts of England and Europe.32 The educational 
imperative to address speech defects is summed up by the editor of the English Journal, 
who remarks in 1915:  
 
The time has come . . . for the setting-up of standards and for improvement in actual 
performance. Certainly teachers, whatever others may do, have no excuse. They must learn to 
talk and to teach others to talk.33  
 
In 1916 these corrective efforts were bolstered by the “Better Speech Week” movement 
in the eastern United States, which would spread to various parts of the country and 
attract much attention by 1924. Better Speech Weeks were explicitly modeled after the 
eugenic “better baby contests” held at state fairs.34 These school events were marked by 
the advent of WWI, and like so many initiatives in this time, were postured as part of the 
war effort. Recruitment testing—the famous Alpha and Beta tests—had shown that 
speech skills and literacy were lacking among thousands of Americans, and failures of 
“pure” spoken English were described as failures of citizenship and of the American 
                                                   
31  Dennis J. McDonald, “Speech Improvement,” National Education Association, Journal of 
Proceedings and Addresses (1916): 864.  
32  Eldridge, A History, 74; Of note also are the “commercial schools” of this period that treated 
stuttering for a fee. Benjamin Bogue, advertising his longstanding institute for stammerers, proclaims 
that “Our age demands perfect speech” (1912).   
33  Editor, The English Journal (1915): 126. 
34  Crumpton, “Speech Betterment,” 569; Better baby contests were eugenic initiatives that 
measured the physical and intellectual development of contestants. Better baby contests were the 
precursor to the “fitter family contests” of the 1920s. As the historian Molly Ladd-Taylor writes, “Both 
initiatives . . . helped to narrow the definition of a ‘healthy, normal’ baby to one that allowed little 
deviation from supposedly scientific norms. Fitter family contests appealed to a select group of 
families assumed to come from good ‘stock,’ with the aim of differentiating them from potential 
‘losers’ who did not fit the norm” (2015). 
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spirit.35 In schools, then, better speech became synonymous with a better nation and 
better soldiers. In 1919-20, posters for Better Speech Weeks included an American flag 
inscribed “One Flag! One Country! One Language!” with slogans such as “One 
Language Means a United People”36 and “Use your speech for service.”37 Depicting 
speech in nationalistic terms mirrors the colonial (not to mention eugenic) imperative to: 
  
Make the ‘Better Speech’ movement one that will make its influence felt even on the future 
generations for if our nation is to lead all others in the triumph of democracy so must her 
language be a language fitting to help her in her task.38  
 
Better Speech Weeks show English speech to be an ever tenuous mark of citizenship, 
democracy, and American nationality.  
These anxieties and the efforts to assuage them demonstrate that neither “good 
speech” nor the need for it were innate among the American people: both had to be 
taught. Even well into the 30s, educators and speech correctionists lamented that 
students and parents alike were overly content with defective voices.39 While some 
parents were worried that their child’s stutter was impeding their education—
demonstrating, again, the socio-economic valence of speech correction—“too many” 
parents would wait calmly for children to outgrow defects rather than seeking 
treatment.40 New and innovative practices were required to enforce and regulate the 
growing social need for good speech.  
 
Calculating Deviance 
 
Following Foucault’s elaboration of “biopolitics,” we suggest that the deep-
seated unease around speech in the early twentieth century is best understood as a 
symptom or correlate of technologies of calculation. That is, norms of proper speech 
emerge only in relation to a system of standardization: surveys, statistics, measurement, 
testing and other technologies employed to distill and order the life of the population. 
Foucault famously argues that beginning in the seventeenth century the sovereign rule 
over territory was increasingly replaced by what he terms “biopower” or 
“governmentality”: the practice of managing the life of human populations. This 
includes the biological processes and potentialities of a set of people like their capacity 
                                                   
35  E.M.H., “Editorial”; Edward Charles Mabie, “Opportunities for Service in Departments of 
Speech,” Quarterly Journal of Speech Education 6, issue 1 (1920): 2. 
36  The Racquet 9, issue 7 (1919): 1.  
37  H. G. Paul, “A Report on Better Speech Week,” The English Journal 9, issue 4 (1920): 194. 
38  The Racquet 9, issue 7 (1919): 2. 
39  Clara B. Stoddard, “A Public School Approach to Treatment of Stuttering,” Journal of Speech 
Disorders 4, issue 3 (1939): 219-222; Charles Van Riper, “Ear Training in the Treatment of Articulation 
Disorders,” Journal of Speech Disorders 4, issue 2 (1939): 141.  
40  Cf. Paul Moore and Dorothy G. Kester, “Historical Notes on Speech Correction in the Pre-
association Era,” Journal of Speech and Hearing Disorder 18 (1953), 49. 
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to work and reproduce. Whereas previous methods of power subjugated people to the 
will of a sovereign (i.e. “don’t do this or you will be killed”), biopower operates quite 
differently by regulating and channeling the productive capacities of a people. To express 
this differently, biopower renders life itself a type of commodity that the state must 
protect and increase while maximizing its civil and economic use. Biopower operates 
both on the population and the individual and is thus manifest in two simultaneous 
modes: biopolitics and disciplinary power. The former entails the practices of calculating 
and regulating the population in terms of “normal” vs “abnormal,” while the latter 
entails practices that corral bodies towards an approximation of that norm.  
 By the early twentieth century, speech was tightly wound into the central 
operations of society, and the state needed a way to calculate and nourish this 
productive, biopolitical capacity. Compulsory education and child labor laws put more 
children in school in the early twentieth century41 and this in turn enabled vast amounts 
of data on speech differences to be produced using technologies like the survey, the 
evaluation, and the standardized test. Such data was organized and rendered 
meaningful by a statistical method that provided a norm, average, and equilibrium 
around which deviance could be calibrated.42 These technologies do not so much 
discover as produce deviance and disability. For example, comparing estimates by Ira S. 
Wile in 1916 and Smiley Blanton in 1936, the number of US school children with “serious 
defects of speech” balloons from 500,000 to 2,000,000 in the span of twenty years.43 
Increasingly “accurate” technologies could calculate speech variation with ever finer 
specification while classifying certain forms of variation as abnormal. In Foucault’s 
terms, statistical calculation is a biopolitical strategy of creating ever more deviance to 
be managed.  
Such statistics targeted the population as a whole; however, calculation was also 
used to dissect the individual herself, calculating “normal” rates of fluency and 
dysfluency, specialized muscle movements, pitch, volume, distinctness, tone, and oral 
                                                   
41  Clarence T. Simon, “Development of Education in Speech and Hearing to 1920,” in History of 
Speech Education in America, ed. Karl R. Wallace (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1954), 400. 
42  The techniques of statistics—the “science of the state”—date back to the mid-eighteenth 
century. Disability theorist Lennard Davis highlights the connection established by statistics between 
the state and the production of the “average” body in the nineteenth century. By distributing the 
general population across a standard deviation, a statistically normal or average subject comes to 
represent an attainable social ideal. Galtonian eugenics was the logical extension of these biopolitical 
calculations, intended to carry out in the social and individual body the imperative of the norm, 
which is in turn “supplemented by the notion of progress, human perfectibility, and the elimination 
of deviance, to create a dominating, hegemonic vision of what the human body should be” (Davis, 
Enforcing Normalcy (New York: Verso, 1995), 35). The line from a science of the state, to Galtonian 
eugenics, to the uptake of statistics by twentieth speech correction is thus not direct but significant 
nonetheless.  
43  Ira S. Wile, “The Economic Value of Speech Correction,” National Education Association, 
Journal of Proceedings and Addresses (1916); Smiley Blanton, “Helping the Speech Handicapped School 
Student,” Journal of Speech Disorders 1, issue 4 (1936): 97-100. 
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reading speeds.44 By making speech calculable within the individual and the social 
body, these technologies allowed correctionists and educators alike to separate the 
“normal” from the “abnormal” in ever more detail, to animate “the speech defect” out of 
this data, and thus materialize the urgent need for intervention in American speech with 
scientific and seemingly objective authority. 
Put another way, the expert practice of diagnosis takes center stage within early 
twentieth century speech correction. Judy Duchan, a historian of Speech-Language 
Pathology, writes that the testing movement,  
 
provided another framework for constructing diagnoses. Rather than just using the presence 
or absence of criterial symptoms as criteria for a diagnosis, diagnosticians began using test 
norms as a guide classifying people into diagnostic groups. Below average performance on 
standardized tests was taken as evidence of a problem.45  
 
Such practices of the science of speech constitute a new object of knowledge—the 
“speaking subject”—through which political authority could be mobilized in an even 
more pervasive manner. 
As Duchan indicates above, diagnostic practices of speech defects did exist before 
the “testing movement,” but were based on biological classifications rather than 
statistical norms. Samuel Potter, a medical doctor who also stuttered, established 
perhaps the first American taxonomy of communication disabilities in 1882. Potter 
focuses primarily on “dyslalia” or stuttering within this work but also outlines 
“paralalia” or “defects of pronunciation” such as lisping, and “alalia” which is 
subdivided into the “paralytic impairment of articulation” and “psychical defects” like 
aphasia.46 Armed with new biomedical diagnostic technologies, Samuel Robbins and 
Sara Stinchfield (both SLPs) update this taxonomy some forty years later with seven 
rather than four subtypes of speech defects. Yet more important than any specific 
diagnostic criteria is the diagnostic practice itself—the act of carving up speech variation 
according to a scientific-medical gaze. That is, problematizing speech in terms of 
normal/pathological enables the oral anxieties of class, race, and ability in the nineteenth 
century to be translated into a standard deviation and, though a series of knowledges 
and techniques, distributes speaking subjects hierarchically according to classifications. 
The “speech defective” thus becomes a concrete subject, a distinct target for strategies of 
normalization over which speech experts wield scientific and medical authority. 
The utility of these technologies of calculation lies not simply in enabling 
interested parties to confirm the existence of speech defects, but in the correlations they 
                                                   
44  Sara Stinchfield, “Practical Speech Measurements,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 9, issue 1 
(1923), 77-84. doi: 10.1080/00335632309379412. 
45  Duchan, “The Diagnostic Practices of Speech-Language Pathologists in America over the 
Last Century,” in Diagnosis as Cultural Practice, eds. Felson Duchan, Judith and Dana Kovarsky 
(Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton), 203. 
46  Samuel O Potter, Speech and its Defects: Considered Physiologically, Pathologically, Historically, 
and Remedially. Philadelphia: P. Blakiston, Son & Co., 1882), 30.  
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make possible between speech defects and other social factors. In 1916 Ira Wile, a 
physician and the commissioner of education in New York City, presented a paper 
entitled “The Economic Value of Speech Correction” to the National Education 
Association. Wile, like many others in his time, argued that speech defects threaten both 
individual and societal wellbeing.47 Citing the calculated cost of educating deaf-mute 
people in American state institutions at approximately twelve million dollars per 
annum, Wile laments that speech defects—much more plentiful and, in his opinion, 
more curable—have received far less attention and funding.48 Wile here invokes a 
simple yet forceful biopolitical calculus: the measurable benefit of addressing certain 
communication disorders far outweighs the economic cost. This calculation is restated 
many times in the decades that follow49 and is, we suggest, a central reason why 
stuttering in particular is a main focus of speech correction in these early days.  
It is hard to underestimate the purely economic value of making unruly speech 
calculable, treatable, and therefore profitable within a liberal-capitalist society 
progressively organized around communication. Wile highlights as part of his 
biopolitical calculation the reluctance of employers to hire people with speech 
disabilities, including for jobs that require minimal speaking, and even warns that 
speech disabilities contribute to costly industrial accidents. If “the economic cost of 
speech defects is registered in the limitations of occupations that are available for 
individuals who have speech deficiencies” then the fluent imperative is clear: “it is but 
natural that we should seek to preserve or secure their potential utility by restoring 
them to normal speech function.”50 And as Van Riper will reiterate twenty years later: 
“unless these speech defectives can be retrained so that they will be able to fill an 
appropriate place in the industrial and professional world, society will continue to suffer 
an economic loss because of them.”51 At stake for speech correction here is not merely 
the rehabilitation of disabled speakers and their integration within flows of capital, but a 
standard of normalcy that can be generalized across the entire population.52  
                                                   
47  Wile, “Economic Value,” 584. 
48  Ibid.; cf. Lewis Madison Terman, The Hygiene of the School Child (Cambridge, MA: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1914), 336. 
49  E.g. Van Riper, Speech Correction: Principles and Methods, First Edition (New York: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1939), 6. 
50  Wile, “The Economic Value,” 584. 
51  Van Riper, Speech Correction, 5. 
52  To put the point more bluntly: the bourgeoisie recognized the economic and political utility 
of speech improvement early on. Reviewing a 1916 symposium on speech, Louis Rapeer, a scholar of 
English at Pennsylvania State College, remarks that “A number of large business firms in this country 
have been so affected by the faulty speech of their employees that they have organized and 
experimentally carried on systematic training in speech” (“Review: A Speech Symposium,” The 
English Journal 5 issue, 7 (1916): 520). Rapeer turns to the example of telephone operators raised in the 
symposium, noting that the Chicago Telephone Company “uses six thousand operators, who carry on 
their great work of connecting up all parts of a city and surrounding towns by the use of forty-five 
million words a day. In their operators’ school, continuing about a month for each candidate, thirty 
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Yet alongside and fuelling economic considerations were the associations 
between defective speech and mental deficiency. Clarence Simon, an SLP, suggests that 
speech correction lagged (relative to deaf education) up until the twentieth century in 
part because educators had understood speech as a mere expression of the mind that did 
not aid its development.53 Psychology, however, established a relation between speech 
and mental development that flows both ways such that uncorrected speech could in 
fact cause deficient minds and personalities. While there was (and continues to be) much 
disagreement, this reversal placed speech in the midst of the biopolitical struggle for life 
itself. The association between speech and mental abnormality demanded expert 
intervention since those without speech training were understood to be at risk of feeble-
mindedness and “retardation.”54 “In Germany,” writes Wile,  
 
investigation has shown that of the 15,000 children in special schools for defectives, 6 per cent 
have associated speech detects. It is thus obvious that the economic importance of speech 
defects is bound up in considerations of the importance of such causative conditions as 
feeble-mindedness, deafness, and neuropathic manifestations.55 
 
While some disabilities like stuttering were eventually let off the intelligence hook, 
others were not so fortunate.56 The ever-growing emphasis on measurement and testing 
revealed difficulties in charting mental capacity at all until “normal” speech was 
acquired.57 Moreover, for many, even those skeptical of the influence of speech upon 
intelligence, the moral and social stakes of uncorrected speech were high. The growing 
focus on mental and emotional development in relation to speech was largely presented 
                                                   
minutes a day are given to speech training, and afterward constant supervision of speech is given 
those who enter the service” (ibid). This is something quite new. Telephone operators are a 
technological linchpin in the emerging industry of telecommunications. And in turn, “forty-five 
million words a day” is a metric of production and human capital, a metric that divorces speech of its 
embodied political and social character and turns it into an economic function to be maximized. The 
telephone operator herself is in turn rendered a biopolitical relay (or perhaps contagion) of speech 
improvement insofar as “this training of operators helps to improve by example and suggestion the 
speech of the public in general” (ibid). Biopower enabled “the controlled insertion of bodies into the 
machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes” 
(Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I (New York: Vintage, 1990), 140) such that voices and 
speakers could only exist as cogs in capitalist production within a system of calibration and 
regulation generalized across the entire population. 
53  Simon, “Development of Education,” 406. 
54  E.g. Wile, “Economic Value,” 583-584; Sara Stinchfield-Hawk, “Can a Child be Taught to 
Talk?” Journal of Speech Disorders 4, issue 2 (1939): 174.  
55  Wile, “Economic Value,” 584. 
56  Eldridge explains that “Virtually no progress [regarding cerebral palsy] was being made in 
the early years of the century. All too often children suffering from this disability were classified as 
mentally defective.” (64-5). 
57  Cf. Stinchfield-Hawk, “Can a Child be Taught.”  
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in terms of social necessity such that uncorrected speech deviants were linked with 
delinquents, criminals, prostitutes, and “general failures.”58 
The correlation between defective speech and personality is perhaps established 
most clearly by mental hygiene, a widespread psycho-social movement of the early 
twentieth century that sought to pre-empt costly social problems by fixing the private 
life of the child. Mental hygiene renders the private sphere—the mind, family, and 
emotions—a seemingly objective matter of political concern and public vigilance,59 and 
thus perfectly embodies biopolitics. This is no more clear than in Terman’s introduction 
to The Hygiene of the School Child, where he states that “the prevention of [human] waste 
has become, in fact, the dominant issue of our entire political, industrial, and 
educational situation.”60 “Speech hygiene” was accordingly prescribed to avoid 
“permanent defects of character”61 with the goal to preserve normalcy “not only for 
ourselves, but also for the generations that are to follow.”62 
The mental hygiene movement thus enabled—both conceptually and 
politically—speech correction to be taken up as a social necessity. It is worth considering 
that many pioneers of modern speech correction were either mental hygienists 
themselves (e.g. Blanton, Fletcher, Wile, Greene) or advocated mental hygiene as part of 
their therapy (e.g. Stinchfield-Hawk, Milisen, Van Riper). Moreover, these two 
institutions were intermingled. For example, speech correction was carried out in child 
guidance clinics63 and the Iowa Child Research Station worked with the pioneering 
speech correction department at the University of Iowa.64 This collaboration was not 
incidental. Biopolitical calculation made defective speech intelligible as a social problem, 
yet the apparatus of mental hygiene effectively bridges the public (the species body) and 
private (the individual body), and the medical and social, such that the danger of 
defective speech could be grasped at the root.65 
                                                   
58  Greene, “The Mission,” 866; cf. Wile, “Economic Value.”  
59  Theresa R. Richardson, The Century of the Child: The Mental Hygiene Movement and Social Policy 
in the United States and Canada (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989), 178. 
60  Terman, Hygiene, 1.  
61  Ibid., 336.  
62  Ibid., 1. 
63  Stinchfield-Hawk, “The Speech Clinician and Community Service,” Journal of Speech Disorders 
6, issue 4 (1941): 131-136. 
64  E.g. Dorothy M. Davis, “The Relation of Repetitions in the Speech of Young Children to 
Certain Measures of Language Maturity and Situational Factors: Part I,” Journal of Speech Disorders 
December 4 (1939): 303-318. doi:10.1044/jshd.0404.303 
65  It is worth highlighting the eugenic overtones of speech correction in the context of the para-
eugenic institutions of child guidance clinics. While speech correction did not participate directly in 
the widespread eugenic horrors of the twentieth century that included sterilization and euthanasia, 
eugenics was never coextensive with such practices, which were, as disability theorist Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson suggests, historically specific (though of course ongoing) means of controlling the 
composition of a particular, imagined, citizenry (“The Case for Conserving Disability,” Journal of 
Bioethical Inquiry 9.3 (2012), 351). Garland-Thomson accordingly broadens the scope of eugenics, 
offering “eugenic logic” as the axiom that “disability is something to be avoided and that the world 
would be a better place if disability could be eliminated” (340). Within this register, SLP clearly abets 
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In sum, reading the speech anxieties of this time as correlates of technologies of 
calculation reformulates the orthodox narrative of SLP. The “growing awareness of the 
need” for speech correction66 was unthinkable without the new categories of normal and 
pathological speech, which were capable of translating numerous social anxieties 
surrounding speech into an appropriately scientific discourse. Diagnostic technologies 
not only created the “speech defect,” but proliferated the problem of vocal deviancy in 
the attempt to contain it. This ultimately proved beneficial for speech correction since 
ever-more deviation consolidated both the discursive authority of speech correction and 
the need for it. Speech correction was commonly described as a matter of altruism and 
charity, yet as a biopolitical project and institution it could only succeed when framed as 
social necessity: an urgent response to the social danger of speech defects, and an 
intervention to create productive bourgeois subjects. It was in the midst of this social 
climate that the practices of speech correction could set to work disciplining the bodies 
and voices of “defective” speakers.   
 
  
                                                   
eugenics, reifying speech and language disabilities as sufferings to be, ultimately, eliminated. SLP’s 
continued and increased drive towards preventative technologies divulges their commitment to a 
semiotic optimization complicit with liberal-capitalism as well as the creation a “better” world 
without communication disability. Van Riper, for example, demonstrates that speech correction has, 
at its core, always been eliminativist when, at the end of his eminent career, he laments his fault in 
focusing on adults rather than children. As he writes, “While I had helped many adults to become 
reasonably fluent and to live satisfying lives, I had done little to stem the yearly appearance over the 
horizon of hordes of new stutterers” (“The Public School Specialist in Stuttering,” ASHA July (1977): 
467). Today, eliminating speech defects from the human population is increasingly envisioned as 
being viable through, for example, promissory genetic studies (e.g. Raza, M.H., Gertz, E.M., 
Mundorff, J., Lukong, J., Kuster, J., Schäffer, A., Drayna, D. 2013. “Linkage Analysis of a Large 
African Family Segregating Stuttering Suggests Polygenic Inheritance and Assortative 
Mating.” Human Genetics 132: 385-396; Domingues, C.E., Olivera, C.M.C., Oliveira, B.V., Juste, F.S., 
Andrade, C.F., Giacheti, C.M., Moretti-Fereira, D., Drayna, D. 2014. “A Genetic Linkage Study in 
Brazil Identifies a New Locus for Persistent Developmental Stuttering on Chromosome 10.” Genetics 
and Molecular Research 13: 2094-2101) and “more effective” preschool treatments such as the 
Lidcombe Program. A future without speech defects still remains beyond reach, but is greatly 
anticipated by many.  
66  Eldridge, A History, 110. 
© Joshua & Charis St. Pierre 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v0i24.5530 
ISSN: 1832-5203 
Foucault Studies, No. 24, pp. 151-184, June 2018 
 165 
Disciplining the Tongue 
 
The feat of constructing an articulate citizenry around a calculated norm was not 
easily achieved: it demanded that speaking bodies, for the first time in history, be made 
“docile.” That is, the productive norms of speech that were measured and defined 
needed to be enacted and maintained within the bodies of individual speakers. The 
earlier discipline and practice of elocution is useful to trace the beginning of this history, 
representing a central site where legible speech was cultivated in nineteenth-century 
America. Elocution was a formal discipline that trained both “normal” and “abnormal” 
speakers to speak legibly, clearly, and embody class respectability through the use of 
vocal and articulation exercises.67 Elocution migrated from England where it had 
established itself in the mid-eighteenth century. One of its chief proponents in England, 
Thomas Sheridan, describes how easily the voice falls into error:  
 
Amongst those who speak in the senate house, pulpit, or at the bar, as well as amongst men 
in private life, we find stammerers, lispers, a mumbling, indistinct utterance; ill management 
of the voice, by pitching it in too high or too low a key; speaking too loud, or too softly as not 
to be heard; and using discordant tones, and false cadences. These being, I say, common to all 
ranks and classes of men, have not any marks of disgrace put upon them, but, on the 
contrary, meet with general indulgence from a general corruption.68 
 
Elocutionists on both sides of the Atlantic thus took it upon themselves to improve the 
quality of spoken language both within public institutions and private practices. The 
latter offered some of the first curative programs for “speech defects” in the nineteenth 
century. Vocal drills and exercises, tongue and laryngeal gymnastics, slowing down 
speech or timing it to a steady rhythm were all methods used to remove speech 
defects.69  
 However, it is important to recognize the political context in which elocution 
emerged as a popular expert on speech within nineteenth-century America. The 
historian Dwight Conquergood reads American elocution in particular from the 
perspective of racial tension and class struggle. “Elocution,” he writes, “expressed in 
another key the body-discipline so characteristic of industrial capitalism, but this was a 
discipline imposed on the bourgeoisie, a way for them to mark ‘distinction’ from the 
masses.”70 The problem with the common word was precisely its commonality; 
                                                   
67  Dwight Conquergood, “Rethinking Elocution: The Trope of the Talking Book and Other 
Figures of Speech,” Text and Performance Quarterly 20.4 (2000): 326. 
68  Thomas Sheridan, “A Course of Lectures on Elocution” 1762, 32-33. 
69  Wingate, Stuttering, 44-56; Bobrick, Knotted Tongues, 91. While both English and American 
elocutionists were motivated by politics of citizenship, more work is needed to trace the migration of 
these practices across dissimilar racial and class contexts.  
70  Conquergood, “Rethinking Elocution,” 326. Conquergood reads elocution as an industrialist 
technology that regulated and in so doing recirculated the excess of orality, analogous to the work of 
the printer’s type within scribal culture (326). Indeed, Conquergood cites Anna Russell’s (1851) The 
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elocution was designed to recover the power of the spoken word from the masses and 
thus reinforce the privilege of white and literate property owners. Subjection is always 
in step with hierarchy, and becoming a refined subject of speech reifies oneself not only 
as human (not animal), but as white (not black), rich and educated (not poor). As 
Conquergood suggests above, elocution deploys a distinctly industrial capitalist set of 
biopolitical operations upon the bourgeois body in this attempt to standardize and 
replicate vocal norms of civility, class, and whiteness. The techniques and strategies of 
elocution that would eventually be adopted by SLP must be understood as intertwined 
with deep racial and class anxieties of speech. 
Foucault offers a framework to understand the “disciplinary” techniques of 
elocution that stand as precursors to speech correction. For Foucault, “disciplinary 
power” is the series of techniques used to manage and control individual subjects (to 
make them docile or manageable) within a population and bring them in line with the 
norm.71 Relations of power do not act directly on individuals—using physical force, for 
example, to modify speech. Rather, a relationship of power for Foucault is a “conduct of 
conduct” that modifies one’s possible range of actions.72 Disciplinary power operates, in 
large part, at the micro-physical level to regulate the precise movements and behaviors 
of the individual body and thus develop and habituate new and productive capacities 
that are always evaluated in relation to the “normal.” This intimate level of power 
relations (what Foucault terms “anatomo-politics”) disciplines the dysfluent body to be 
more measured, rational, and efficient and is, we suggest, central to the very function of 
SLP as a biopolitical apparatus. 
 In the broadest strokes, elocution and later speech correction enact a series of 
disciplinary operations upon the body to break the speech-gesture into a series of 
discrete micro-physical actions that can be evaluated, controlled, and optimized. Citing 
as examples the mid-eighteenth century elaborations of marching, good handwriting, 
and firing a rifle, Foucault argues that discipline renders the body an efficient and 
compliant machine whose activity is meticulously controlled in relation to temporal and 
gestural norms. Disciplinary practices targeting speech resemble each of the above 
examples. Like the march, the proper speaking body is pierced by time such that all its 
movements are fastidiously assigned a duration and succession. Speech correction 
habituates the speaking body to move in standardized rhythms, to embody measured 
                                                   
Young Ladies’ Elocutionary Reader where the uncultivated voice is described as an error, a smudge: “It 
resembles, in its effect to the ear, that presented to the eye, when the sheet has been accidentally 
disturbed in the press, and there comes forth, instead of the clear, dark, well-defined letter, executed 
distinctly on the fair white page, a blur of half-shade” (15; cited in Conquergood 326). Vocal smudges 
exist only in relation to systems of standardization such that creating a social factory (albeit here in a 
nascent stage) that both cultivates and standardizes the capacity of speech can only serve to circulate 
and proliferate the problem of excess and its correlate: the vocal deviant. 
71  Foucault, Discipline and Punish. 
72  Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 138. 
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time, and thus integrate into the ordered beat of capitalist machinery.73 Proper speech, 
like good handwriting, is moreover a gesture, an entire anatomical routine that must be 
performed efficiently such that “nothing . . . remain[s] idle or useless.”74  
 Foucault’s third example is perhaps the most salient: discipline optimizes the 
functions of the body in relation to an external object—fastening the body-object 
together as an efficient and cohesive machine. Foucault illustrates this power relation 
using the eighteenth-century maneuver of firing a rifle:  
 
Bring the weapon forward. In three stages. . . . At the third stage, let go of the rifle with the 
left hand, which falls along the thigh, raising the rifle arm half flexed, the elbow close to the 
body, the thumb lying against the lock, resting against the first screw, the hammer resting on 
the first finger, the barrel perpendicular.75  
 
This example of discipline is now famous, but Foucault could just have easily cited the 
elaboration of the speaking act by Harvard elocution teacher Jonathan Barber in 1831: 
 
In pronouncing the word MAN the lips are first intentionally brought together and pressed 
in a certain way against each other, and air being at the same time forcibly impelled from the 
throat, a sound is heard which somewhat resembles the lowing of an ox. The lips which 
before were held in somewhat forcible contact are now separated, the mouth is opened and 
its cavity is put into a particular shape; and air being again impelled from the throat during 
this position of the mouth, the sound A is heard as that letter is pronounced in the word a-t. 
Finally this last sound being completed, the tip of the tongue is carried upwards from the 
lower part of the mouth, and air issuing from the throat in a forcible manner during this state 
of the parts, the peculiar sound appropriate to the letter N is heard.76 
 
Disciplining the speaking body renders the voice itself a manipulable object. Barber is 
explicitly applying in the classroom the theory of James Rush, the first to identify, 
through a systematic taxonomy, the physiology of speech production in relation to 
mechanistic elements—force, pitch, quality, rhythm—of the voice.77 Through Barber and 
Rush’s elocutionary technologies, speech is translated into a micro-physical maneuver 
that simultaneously fashions the voice while ob/abjectifying it. Put otherwise, like the 
firing of a rifle, discipline meticulously loads the mouth, tongue, and lungs in order to 
expel the voice efficiently and correctly. So that the voice be pliable and correctable—so 
that the voice be a compliant target of biopolitical imperatives—the speaking body must 
be made docile in each minute movement. 
                                                   
73  Cf. St. Pierre, “Distending Straight-Masculine Time.” 
74  Foucault, Discipline, 152. 
75  Quoted in ibid., 153. 
76  Jonathan Barber, Practical Treatise on Gesture (Cambridge, MA: Hilliard and Brown, 1931), 17-
18; quoted in Mary Margaret Robb, “The Elocutionary Movement and its Chief Figures,” in History of 
Speech Education, 185-6. 
77  James Rush, The Philosophy of the Human Voice (Philadelphia, PA: J. Maxwell, 1872); Cf. Lester 
L. Hale, “Dr. James Rush,” in History of Speech Education in America, 226. 
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There is, by necessity, no linear path from these early disciplinary practices to 
speech correction: truth is always a matter of contestation. Rush was widely scorned in 
his time for rendering speech mechanical and Barber was similarly dismissed from 
Harvard in 1834 due to the unpopularity of his disciplinary methods.78 By mid-century, 
elocution had largely fallen out of favor within the academy due not to a flagging 
interest in spoken language but the belief that elocution was too artificial, mechanical, 
and exhibitionary (that is, too rationalistic) to service a capacity like speech. In the 
remainder of the century, speech education was increasingly linked with English 
literature while elocution both dropped to an elective status and migrated from public to 
private institutions. 
Twentieth-century speech correctionists regularly belittled elocutionists as 
“quacks and charlatans”79 who employed archaic methods such as breathing exercises, 
rhythmic exercises, and vocal drills to “fix” speech defectives for a fee. Yet while SLPs 
decried these practices as quackery, they continued to wield them by divorcing in 
growing measure their etiological from their disciplinary functions. In the 1910s speech 
correctionists readily adopted anatomo-political methods such as tongue gymnastics 
and enunciating single words slowly and distinctly.80 By the 30s speech correctionists no 
longer believed that stuttering was caused by, for instance, cramps in the larynx that 
needed to be overcome through exercises, yet practices that habituate slow, distinct, 
rhythmic, and smooth speech only intensified.  
To take but a few examples, Irene Pool Davis proposed a speech program for 
elementary school curriculum built upon relaxation, rhythm, and articulation.81 Adult 
stutterers practiced “prolongations,” “the pull-out”82 and what Wendell Johnson termed 
“the bounce”83: all micro-physical maneuvers that enable a correct and measured use of 
the body and a correct use of time.84 In an exercise that would have been praised by 
Rush and Barber, Van Riper argues that the stutterer may need a good deal of practice in 
changing the configuration of words.85 A stutterer who, for example, often stumbled on 
the word ‘rabbit’ may understand it as beginning not with an ‘r’ but a ‘b’: that is, 
‘raa.BBit.’ Modifying one’s stuttering in this instance accordingly requires that the 
                                                   
78  David H. Grover, “Elocution at Harvard: The Saga of Jonathan Barber,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 51, issue 1 (1965): 65. doi: 10.1080/00335636509382703 
79  e.g. Russell, “Section on Elementary, Popular, and Semi-popular Articles”; Van Riper, Speech 
Correction. 
80  E.g. Scripture, Stuttering; J. S. Gaylord, “Speech Improvement,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 5, 
issue 4 (1919): 358-367. doi: 10.1080/00335631909360762; Mrs. Frank A. Reed, “Speech Work in the 
Detroit Public Schools.” National Education Association, Journal of Proceedings and Addresses (1916): 870; 
Blanton, “Stammering and the Voice Teacher.” 
81  Irene Pool Davis, “A Speech Program for the Changing Elementary School Curriculum,” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 22, issue 3 (1936): 454-457. 
82  Van Riper, Speech Correction. 
83  Johnson, “Stuttering,” in Speech Handicapped School Children eds. Johnson et. al (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1956).  
84  Foucault, Discipline, 152. 
85  Van Riper, Speech Correction, 383. 
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linguistic unit itself be broken down, rearranged, and reconnected according to more 
useful spatial and temporal linguistic configurations. The speaking body must then 
comport and discipline itself in relation to these norms such that the body-voice 
machine can eject words clearly and evenly. These practices were routinely 
psychologized and utilized for various, and often conflicting, reasons. What we wish to 
emphasize, however, is that such sustained practices used to discipline and mold the 
body were speech correction’s very condition of possibility. 
By the early twentieth century, the normalization of the speaking body had 
become a biopolitical necessity, developed and employed in service of productivity. As 
speech correction spread throughout society via public and private school systems, child 
guidance clinics, and hospital clinics throughout the 20s and 30s, it increasingly 
functioned as a social apparatus that enabled “speech defectives” to join the sphere of 
useful citizens. This shift aligns with what disability historian Henri-Jacques Stiker 
(1999) describes as the rehabilitative initiative, which took hold from the 1920s onward 
within Western societies. Previous to this period, disabled people were largely held up 
as different and segregated within such institutions as the household or the asylum. 
However, the rehabilitative turn establishes disabled people as “a category to be 
reintegrated and thus to be rehabilitated,”86 to make them, as much as possible, “like the 
rest”: like the statistical norm. Focusing on stuttering once again, stutterers haltingly 
came to be understood in the 30s as ontologically identical to non-stutterers. And, as 
Johnson argues, if stutterers are different in speech behavior, “nevertheless, they are 
alterable to the extent that one is justified in operating clinically on the assumption that 
they can become non-stutterers.”87 As rehabilitatable, disabled people, stutterers, can 
now come to take their place within “the machinery of production, consumption, work, 
and play in the day-to-day community.”88  
In Foucauldian terms, rehabilitation seeks to circulate, rather than segregate, 
disabled speakers within the social milieu such that they become productive as the 
target of multiple discourses and practices. Segregation is a form of power that 
“concentrates, focuses, and encloses.”89 Segregation as a governing logic is epitomized in 
institutions such as the asylum or eugenic “training schools” for the so-called feeble-
minded, an institutional logic that seeks to contain the threat of abnormality, of 
disability, within a bounded and totalized space by letting nothing escape. However, 
speech resists this type of closure, and its normalization must be mobilized by a 
different logic. Speech is public (in both ontology and function) and its unimpeded 
circulation had become essential to the exercise of power by the early twentieth century. 
Indeed, the need for always more speech is one reason SLP censured the “quacks and 
charlatans” who operated commercial and private clinics: speech correction is a 
                                                   
86  Henri-Jacques Stiker, A History of Disability, trans. William Sayers (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1990), 134. 
87  Johnson, “Treatment of Stuttering,” 170. 
88  Stiker, History of Disability, 128. 
89  A mode of governance Foucault terms “discipline” in contrast to “security.” Security, 
Territory, Population, 44. 
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necessarily public and circulatory apparatus. This imperative—that speech must 
circulate—places speech correction close to the form of governance Foucault terms 
“security,” where power operates in an open field, “organizing circulation, eliminating 
its dangerous elements, making a division between good and bad circulation, and 
maximizing the good circulation by diminishing the bad.”90 The question for speech 
correction is not “how can we isolate the speech defect?” as much as “how can we 
regulate the circulation of speech and mitigate, if we cannot cancel out, its dangers?”91 
The ability to regulate and make disabled speaking bodies socially and 
economically useful is thus basic to technologies that normalize the tongue. It is not 
coincidental that Van Riper prefaces his monumental 1939 Speech Correction: Principles 
and Methods by proclaiming the social and economic utility of disabled individuals, 
problematizing speech disability in distinctly biopolitical terms,92 nor that starting in the 
30s Van Riper and Johnson, both highly influential speech correctionists, push to 
rehabilitate stuttering rather than curing it outright—a eugenic feat recognized as being 
more and more unattainable. The goal of speech correction in their estimation should be 
modifying stuttering to reduce its abnormality. As relayed by a former client, Van Riper 
claimed that “Some of his clients were able to control their speech to such a degree that 
for all practical purposes they were considered completely fluent, not cured, but with a 
controlled speech pattern. . . . This controlled speech let them join the world of the 
fluent.”93 What we might today call “inclusion”94 hinges on making dysfluent speech as 
socially acceptable as possible. “Joining the world of the fluent” is a thinly veiled 
analogue for normalization: in this instance, approximating the norm of “fluent” speech 
such that one can access, ever tenuously, a dominant linguistic society. And from the 
inverse perspective, “joining the world of the fluent” is shorthand for integrating 
dysfluency into (that is, including dysfluency within) productive flows of 
communication, affect, and sociability.    
Yet however important the immediate output of economic productivity may be, 
speech correction filled the much larger role of consolidating and maintaining a system 
of normalizing control over speaking bodies. Biopower, as Foucault argues, has sought 
“an increasingly controlled, more rational, and economic process of adjustment . . . 
between productive activities, communicative networks, and the play of power 
                                                   
90  Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, ibid.  
91  With this being said, it is important not to overplay the rehabilitative or circulatory function 
of speech correction. The performance of speech is always a thoroughly ableist marker and metric of 
human rationality, a dividing line that subhumanizes and justifies the institutionalization and 
exclusion of disabled people—especially autistic and intellectually disabled people. We must thus 
recognize speech correction to operate, as Deleuze and Guattari would say, as both a smoothing and 
striating machine.  
92  Van Riper, Speech Correction, 5. 
93  George G. Helliesen, Forty Years After Therapy: One Man’s Story (Newport, VA: Apollo Press, 
2002), 27-8. 
94  David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder, The Biopolitics of Disability (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 2015). 
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relations.”95 By communicative networks, Foucault means systems of transmitting signs 
(or other symbolic mediums) through which, for example, a teacher can give lessons and 
orders, ask questions, and thereby exercise disciplinary power. When communicative 
networks are understood to rely on a biopolitics of speech (and aurality more generally), 
dysfluency emerges as a destabilizing threat to the operations of power. Consider the 
classroom, an important institutional site of semiotic normalization. In 1912, Edward W. 
Scripture96 represents stutterers and lispers as, respectively, an “irritating distraction to 
their teachers” and a “needless retardation to their classes.”97 That same year, the 
psychologist, mental hygienist, and stutterer John Madison Fletcher stated the threat of 
defective speech in even more stark and industrial terms:  
 
If I understand the great movement for efficiency in commercial lines as Dr. Taylor98 and 
others have conceived it, the first point of attack is the sources of lost energies, misplaced 
efforts and neglected forces. In other words, the whole efficiency movement begins with the 
stoppage of leaks, lost motions and costly frictions. . . . If you should stand before a class in which 
there was a stuttering boy trying to recite, and watch this stumbling, halting, blushing and 
writhing embodiment of mental torture, and see the sympathy, worry, distraction of attention 
and anxiety of the teacher no less than the rest of the class, you could understand what I 
mean by this great leakage of energy.99 
 
From the perspective not simply of communicative networks, but the interface between 
production, communicative networks, and relations of power, fluency comes to be 
problematized in terms of systems, a lack of friction, and usable energy. And inversely, 
the apparatus of speech correction renders dysfluency a form of entropy or non-usable 
energy that can and must be managed—yet ironically, in accordance with the second 
law of thermodynamics, never destroyed.100 
                                                   
95  Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 137; emphasis added.  
96  Scripture was an American physician, phonetician, and experimental psychologist who 
worked on speech science and pathology.  
97  Scripture, Stuttering, v.  
98  Frederick Winslow Taylor was a mechanical engineer who at the turn of the century 
developed a theory of management termed “scientific management,” metonymically referred to as 
Taylorization, used to increase industrial productivity through the mechanization and deskilling of 
labor. 
99  John Madison Fletcher, “Speech Defects in Children,” in The American Journal of Obstetrics and 
Diseases of Women and Children January-June (1912): 148, 149; emphasis added. 
100  While true that speech correction presupposes and reproduces deviance through its 
technologies of normalization, this reproduction is nevertheless useful in generalizing and thus 
consolidating the discursive authority of speech correction across the social field. This movement 
follows Foucault’s insistence that “The bourgeoisie could not care less about delinquents, about their 
punishment and rehabilitation, which economically have little importance, but it is concerned with 
the complex mechanisms with which delinquency is controlled, pursued, punished and reformed” 
(“Two Lectures,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, ed. Colin Gordon (New 
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 Reading speech correction as an apparatus that maximizes useable 
(communicative) energy through the generalized production of the capacity of speech 
on the one hand, and the stoppage of leaks, lost motions, and costly frictions on the 
other, returns us to the Foucauldian insight that rehabilitation must organize circulation, 
minimizing the bad circulation to maximize the good. Speech correction works both to 
free the circulation of speech within society and to maximally integrate dysfluent (as 
well as deaf, “non-verbal,” and neuro-diverse) subjects into the productive flows of 
communicative networks.101 The historian and philosopher François Ewald argues that 
technologies of normalization at the turn of the century sought to institute a “common 
language” across industrial, bureaucratic, political, and social spheres such that these 
differing elements could understand each other and form a productive and cohesive 
society.102 Docile communicative bodies are requisite for fluent communicative 
networks, and prior to SLP the state had no way to manage (the leakiness of) speech, to 
bring it under the fold of biopower in an ever more streamlined and rational 
communicative society. Van Riper could have hardly been more honest when he stated 
that, “In any society so dependent upon communication, the ‘teaching of talking’ must 
finally achieve an important place in education.”103  
 
 
Speaking the Truth 
 
Some might gesture here to the altruistic aims of the founders of speech 
correction and insist our claim that speech correction is a normalizing apparatus serving 
biopolitical goals and values is altogether missing the point. Indeed, individual speech 
correctionists (many of whom, historically, are stutterers) have largely benevolent 
motives. It is moreover important to recognize that the early twentieth-century was not 
kind to people with speech disabilities. Consider, for example, Scripture’s depiction of 
the stutterer’s fate: 
 
                                                   
York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 102). In the context of a society where communication is being pushed 
to the fore, the vocal delinquent will have more economic importance than would the criminal 
delinquent, yet Foucault’s point stands. The technologies invented to curb the defective and reinforce 
class and race distinctions start to become economically and politically useful (“Two Lectures,” 101) 
which results in speech correction circulating more densely within the social field. 
101  Wile, for example, makes no qualms about the biopolitical stakes: “The actual cost of speech 
defects to society cannot be estimated at the present time in dollars and cents. The limitations of self-
expression is a loss to the individual and to the community. Speech defects which interfere with the 
fullest expansion of consciousness along the lines of culture and industry are anti-social. They 
decrease the social worth of the individual and rob the community of the full fruits of human 
mentality. They retard and pervert economic power” (585).  
102  François Ewald, “Norms, Discipline, and the Law,” Representations 30, Spring (1990): 151. 
103  Van Riper, Speech Correction, vii. 
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Few persons realize how terrible life becomes to a stutterer. . . . Every time he tries to speak 
he is obliged to make a fool of himself in such a way as to make other people want to laugh at 
him. One religious but stuttering lady finally demanded to be “cured or chloroformed.” One 
boy often threw himself on the floor, begging his mother to tell him how to die. Another boy 
asked for a letter to his father, telling him to keep the other children from laughing at him. 
Many stutterers become so sensitive that they imagine everyone is constantly making fun of 
them. The life of a stutterer is usually so full of sorrow that it can hardly be said to be worth 
living.104  
 
Scripture no doubt sensationalizes the lived experience of stutterers in an appeal to pity 
and charity,105 but autobiographies from this time106 make it clear that people with 
speech disabilities sought therapy because of disability oppression—internalized and 
not. In turn, we readily acknowledge that speech correctionists were most often 
concerned with the well-being of their client; the normalizing and eugenic character of 
their practices well off the radar. Yet the therapeutic character of SLP is precisely the 
point. Not only does focusing on individual well-being obscure the socio-political 
structure and effects of SLP, but as the social theorist Nikolas Rose argues in the context 
of psychology, “to rule citizens democratically means ruling them through their 
freedoms, their choices, and their solidarities rather than despite these.”107 We 
accordingly suggest that understanding SLP as a normalizing institution requires the 
issue be reframed in terms of governance and authority. That is, we must ask how SLP 
became what Foucault terms a “regime of truth.” How did modern speech correction 
gain the legitimacy and authority to speak the truth about dysfluent bodies and 
dysfluent people themselves such that these subjects willingly submitted themselves to 
disciplinary practices? How does benevolence mask and sustain disciplinary power? 
Establishing authority over speaking bodies required that speech correction 
accredit its knowledge as truth and carefully position itself as a scientific discipline. This 
involved, in Foucault’s terms, a “game of truth,” a social process of exclusion “in which 
arguments, evidence, theories, and beliefs are thrust to the margins, not allowed to enter 
‘the true’.”108 Like many fledgling sciences of this time, speech correction faced an uphill 
battle of being recognized as a legitimate discipline, and this was accomplished over 
time by aligning itself with medical, phonological, and psychological discourses while 
expunging competing discourses from ‘the true’. Labelling elocutionists “quacks and 
                                                   
104  Scripture, Stuttering, 3. 
105  Note that while Scripture appeals to charity, as highlighted in the previous section, he also 
begins to problematize the speech defect in the biopolitical terms of economic cost and the good of 
society. The oscillation between these poles is an essential dynamic of the government of disability.    
106  E.g. Johnson, Because I Stutter (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1930); Whitten, Ida E. 1990. 
“The Face of all the World is Changed”: An Autobiographical Study with the Focus on Stuttering. Cincinnati, 
OH: Scott Zoller. 
107  Rose, Inventing, 117; emphasis added. 
108  Ibid., 55. 
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charlatans” and barring their knowledges from speech correction journals109 enabled 
speech correction to sustain a myth of linear scientific progress. As Elmer Kenyon 
phrased it in a letter to the editor of the Journal of Speech Disorders, “The future of the 
American Speech Correction Association depends on its looking upward and forward 
rather than backward and downward.”110 The legitimacy of speech correction was 
established not simply by “looking forward” but by severing itself from its past. Van 
Riper, for example, claims that the profession of speech pathology was established in the 
1930s,111 boldly discounting a century of foundational knowledges and practices from 
which it draws. Speech correction thus ratifies the present through what Rose calls a 
“lapsed history” of “false paths, of errors and illusions, of prejudice and mystification—
all those cul-de-sacs into which knowledge was drawn and which diverted it from the 
path of progress.”112 Jostling for “the truth” of the speech defect was of course nothing 
new, yet it is important to note the ways in which the modern speech correction 
institution consolidated authority while spreading its roots into society, thus giving 
concrete expression and density to an ableist field of truth.113  
Harnessing the social, political, and economic anxieties around speech required 
an appropriately scientific and objective language. Besides the delayed biopolitical 
“need,” one reason speech correction lagged behind other medico-disciplinary 
institutions was that it lacked the necessary instruments to objectify speech mechanisms 
and thus render them scientific objects. As Van Riper writes of the early period of SLP:  
Back then we had no texts, no tools. We recorded our clients’ speech on wax phonograph 
cylinders. Our sound waves were scratched on a smoke kymograph drum. Using tuning 
forks of different frequencies, we calibrated hearing loss by marks on the office carpet. We 
had no standardized tests.114  
 
Nineteenth century technologies such as the stethoscope, microscope, and x-rays were 
elevating the medical profession as a whole; doctors and scientists were now able to 
look inside the human body, suddenly privy to seemingly objective knowledges that 
even patients themselves could not access. Speech pathology likewise only began to 
mobilize the profound authority of this “medical gaze” through developing its own 
technologies such as the laryngoscope and kymographic tracings,115 offering the 
discipline verifiable positive knowledge and thus credibility by scientific standards. In 
                                                   
109  E.g. Russell, “Section on Elementary”; Elmer Lawton Kenyon, “The Question of our Ethics 
and Standards,” Journal of Speech Disorders 4, issue 4 (1939): 302. 
110  Kenyon, “The Question,” 302. 
111  Van Riper, “Where and Whither,” 483. 
112  Rose, Inventing, 42. 
113  Cf. Josephine Hoegaerts, “‘Is it a Habit or is it a Disease?’ The Changing Social Meaning of 
Stammering in Nineteenth-Century Western Europe,” Terrains & Travaux 23 (2013): 17-37. 
114  Van Riper, “Recollections from a Pioneer,” ASHA (1989): 72-73. 
115  The former device enables a direct observation of the vocal cords and the latter is used to 
record graphically the vibrations of the voice. 
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the wake of a culture-wide “scientization of the social,”116 speech correction carefully 
positioned itself to speak the objective—read, pathologizing—truth of the stuttering 
body.117  
In addition to medicalization, SLP flourished on the coattails of psychology. Since 
the late-nineteenth century, speech correction steadily aligned itself with psychological 
methodology and practice: allying with mental hygiene, flirting with psychoanalysis, 
and finally articulating their practice as “speech therapy.” Problematizing both the 
enigma of speech disability and the mode of their rehabilitation in psychological terms is 
significant for two reasons. 
First, Rose suggests that psychology is best understood as an “intellectual 
technique” that renders the “human soul into thought in the form of calculable 
traces.”118 Psychology, put otherwise, transforms subjectivity into a scientific object that 
can be measured, ordered, and verified. These seemingly objective methods dissect the 
self and speak its truths from within. Under the guidance of psychology, SLP 
subsequently did not target the speech phenomenon but the stuttering individual as a 
whole.119 This strategy exposed the speech defect to an entirely new range of 
interventions: while elocutionary disciplinary practices could pick apart the stuttered 
voice and speech mechanisms, they were unable to calculate and normalize the 
attitudes, emotions, environment, and thoughts of the stutterer herself. Transformed by 
this vast array of positive knowledge, the discursive authority of SLP began to saturate 
the entire domain of the stuttering individual and consolidate the expert gaze. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, while psychology opened a vast 
epistemic and therefore disciplinary terrain within the stuttering individual, it 
transformed not only the sites but also the mode of discipline. Rose argues that 
psychology fundamentally changed the way political authority is mobilized, becoming 
“not so much a matter of ordering, controlling, commanding obedience and loyalty, but 
of improving the capacity of individuals to exercise authority over themselves.”120 
Psychology reorganized the biopolitical good of society around such individualizing 
principles as happiness, normality, quality of life, and self-improvement, while 
                                                   
116  Joris Vandendriessche, Evert Peeters, and Kaat Wils, eds. Scientists’ Expertise as Performance: 
Between State and Society, 1860–1960 (Brookfield, VT: Pickering & Chatto Ltd, 2015). 
117  It is noteworthy that Scripture grounds this fledgling science of speech on a 
normal/abnormal binary: “In most medical faculties, no place is accorded to speech defects; the same 
is true in schools of pedagogy. This was formerly justified on the ground that a scientific study of 
speech and its defects did not exist. In the last decade, however, the science of phonetics has extended 
itself to laboratory work and university teaching; moreover, speech clinics have been established in 
several of the foremost medical schools. The treatment of these defects thus stands upon an entirely 
new basis; namely, that of a carefully developed science of normal and pathological speech (Stuttering, v; 
emphases added). 
118  Rose, Inventing, 74. 
119  E.g. Charles Van Riper and Robert L. Milisen, “A study of the predicted duration of the 
stutterers blocks as related to their actual duration,” Journal of Speech Disorders 4, issue 4 (1939): 356; 
Simon, “Development of Education,” 407.  
120  Rose, Inventing, 64. 
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simultaneously making each self responsible for approximating these norms 
(foreshadowing the neoliberal “entrepreneur of the self”). The significance of the 
individual regulating not merely her own behavior but also her most fleeting thoughts 
and beliefs, convinced that this self-regulation is in her own best interest, can hardly be 
overstated. The psychologist—the Speech-Language Pathologist—becomes a mere 
facilitator of self-normalization. 
While speech correction as a whole remained ambivalent regarding the 
etiological relation between stuttering and psychology, the effort of, for example, 
Johnson, Van Riper, and Bryngelson during the 30s to steer the practice of speech 
correction down rehabilitative and therapeutic lines was tremendously successful. The 
rehabilitative and normalizing imperative of SLP, while still retaining its political and 
socio-economic undertone, progressively appealed to individual happiness and self-
improvement. Presented in terms of one’s own best interest and objective knowledge, 
the stutterer happily accepted the disciplinary reigns. As Ida Whitten, a client of Travis, 
Johnson, and Van Riper, remarked: “It was my speech problem, my future. I, I alone, 
had to accept responsibility for the outcome of my problem. . . . This was of the greatest 
importance to me, and it is of the very greatest importance in the rehabilitation of any 
stutterer.”121 Such beliefs, uncoincidentally resonant with the Protestant work ethic, were 
facilitated by a regime of truth with a “low epistemic profile,”122 existing for the most 
part out of sight. Speech correctionists did not stop taming the tongue but rather began 
to exercise their authority more diffusely. In the name of “ethics”123 and beneficent self-
improvement and happiness, the therapist assumes the role of assisting the stutterer’s 
internalization of the disciplinary apparatus. This new, ethical relationship with oneself 
and with one’s therapist enables normalization to be exercised to a degree impossible 
via external coercion. The biopolitical communicative subject was, in short, produced 
from the inside out. 
To illustrate this infolding of the speaking subject, SLPs recognized early on that 
normalization required the stutterer to view herself as the therapist viewed her, to assess 
and intervene in her own speech at all times and places. Mirror work was a technique 
often used early in therapy, wherein a stutterer was forced to confront her own 
spectacle: view her face through blocks and grimaces, so as to appreciate the motions 
and tensions of her body and “find a way of helping [herself].”124 Stutterers were given 
assignments to perform outside the clinic about which they would write detailed 
accounts to submit before the reviewing eye of the therapist: e.g. “Describe your 
dominant speech problems during an hour,” “Describe your dominant emotions of the 
                                                   
121  Ida E. Whitten, “The Face of all the World is Changed”: An Autobiographical Study with the Focus 
on Stuttering (Cincinnati, OH: Scott Zoller, 1990), 119. 
122  Rose, Inventing. 
123  Ibid., 64. 
124  Whitten, Face of all the World, 48. 
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day.”125 Van Riper demanded “continual vigilance”126 and in the words of his client, 
“The stutterer will relapse unless he continues to work every day, perhaps every waking 
hour, to keep his speech good.”127  
Speech correction thus emerged not as an isolated institution but as a totalizing 
methodology and discourse through which the stutterer came to view herself and her 
speech. For Foucault, such self-surveillance is akin to the panopticon: an enclosed tower 
invented for nineteenth century prison complexes which allowed guards to view all 
prisoners in their cells at any time, but did not reveal to the prisoners when they were 
on display.128 The phenomenon of being open to the disciplining gaze at all times 
produces a culture of self-surveillance, wherein one learns to monitor and censor her 
own behaviour through the internalized gaze of the guard. By teaching stutterers to 
survey and correct not only their speech behavior but their most minute thoughts and 
emotions in accordance with the terms and goals of SLP, the disciplinary authority of 
speech correction travels with(in) the individual herself.129 The stutterer becomes a 
compliant and confessing self-governing subject.  
While such therapeutic practices had a totalizing authoritative effect on the 
speech of stutterers, it must be emphasized that self-surveillance was only accepted due 
to the medical and scientific objectivity by which these technologies of power were 
authorized. Making the individual a subject of this pathologizing discourse—teaching it 
as the objective truth of her condition—was the first and foundational step in 
normalizing control. This practice is described by Van Riper, Bryngelson, and others as 
the “objective attitude”: the “unemotional admission of [one’s] speech difference as a 
problem to be solved.”130 Stuttered speech is here a problem rooted in one’s body that 
must be accepted realistically as an objective fact.131 In framing such a stance as 
objective, and requiring stutters to accept it without emotion or conflict, SLP grounds its 
own necessity, and the surveillance and discipline that will follow, as the naturalized 
truth of every stuttering body. The objective attitude—the medical gaze itself—is 
structured by a compulsory curative logic that is profoundly depoliticizing.  
Here the full force of SLP can be felt. Internalizing the normalizing apparatus via 
the objective attitude is a manifestation of the individualizing power Foucault terms 
“subjection.” This mode of power “applies itself to immediate everyday life which 
                                                   
125  Helliesen, Forty Years, 68-9. 
126  Van Riper, The Nature of Stuttering, Second Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1982), 2. 
127  Whitten, Face of all the World, 166-7. 
128  Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 195-228. 
129  Moreover, the totalizing character of SLP arises precisely from the fact that it is not a discrete 
institution, but a set of discontinuous practices generalized across the social field. As Van Riper puts 
it, “Educators are recognizing what professional speech pathologists have always known—that the 
work of the specialist must be supplemented by intelligent classroom and home cooperation if the 
millions of speech defectives are to have adequate help” (1939, vii; emphasis added).  
130  Van Riper, Speech Correction, 362. 
131  Ibid., 83. 
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categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own 
identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to 
recognize in him.”132 By disciplining oneself and confessing the “truth” of oneself in 
pathologized terms, the dysfluent individual is rendered a medicalized, psychologized, 
and deviant subject—“a stutterer.” Subjection imposes a law of truth that creates the 
dysfluent individual, a truth by which she is recognized and must recognize herself. It is 
thus not coincidental that Johnson opens his autobiography by proclaiming: “I am a 
stutterer. I am not like other people. I must think differently, act differently, live 
differently,”133 and again, as Whitten acknowledges: “The stutterer should continually 
acknowledge that he is a stutterer.”134 That these confessions are deliberate and a 
function of biopower is evidenced by Van Riper’s injunction that, 
 
the stutterer should be required to admit his stuttering as a daily routine. Thus, whenever the 
author’s stutterers enter the door of the clinic, they are required to say to themselves, ‘for the 
time being, Mister----, you’re a stutterer. No use posing as something else. Better get to work 
on your problem if you want to get rid of the handicap’.135  
 
Being identified as a stutterer welded one to the logic and expertise of SLP.136 The 
efficacy of normalization and thus the ability to access the world of the fluent hinges on 
abandoning oneself to the medicalized truth of speech correction as a subject of speech 
correction. Yet it must be remembered that while Van Riper’s instruction is telling, it 
was always only superfluous since “the stutterer” was created not by a speech act but 
through the sustained application of technologies of power upon oneself. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The advent of modern speech correction structured the experience of disabled 
speakers and their place within society in new and enduring ways. Statistical calculation 
and other diagnostic practices escalated not only the numbers but types of pathologized 
speakers, and cultural anxieties mobilized these differences into a matter of not only 
individual, but social, economic, and national concern. Treatment for speech disabilities 
became both more accessible and seemingly necessary within a modern world saturated 
with flows of information. Scientific and therapeutic understandings of speech and 
disability converged to internalize the practices and goals of speech correction within 
individuals, confirming both the objective truth of their problem and the need for its 
treatment. The early decades of speech correction worked to crystalize the threat of 
deviance and the promise of normalcy, both across the population and within the souls 
of individual disabled speakers.  
                                                   
132  Foucault, “Subject and Power,” 130. 
133  Johnson, Because I Stutter, 1. 
134  Whitten, Face of all the World, 160. 
135  Van Riper, Speech Correction, 364.  
136  Rose, Inventing, 96. 
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There is surely a need to stretch this analysis into the present, examining the 
transformation of speech correction in tandem with the privatization of the welfare state, 
the neoliberalization of eugenics, the emergence of post-industrial labor that subsists on 
and exploits communicative subjectivities, and the increased specialization of the 
profession. SLP has doubtlessly evolved. It is moreover important to demonstrate that 
for all speech correction has changed, constituted by practices of calculating deviance, 
disciplining the tongue, and speaking the truth, it has changed very little. 
Advancements in genetic research and “better” preschool therapies inch slowly closer to 
the original eugenic goal of eliminating speech defects—that is, forms of human 
variation. While “speech hygiene” has been re-coded in the more palatable discourse of 
enabling “effective communication,”137 SLP remains a biopolitical apparatus of the 
(transnational) state. These essential features of SLP do not, of course, cancel out 
important work that the discipline does in helping speech disabled people survive in an 
ableist world. As Foucault writes, “My point is not that everything is bad, but that 
everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is 
dangerous, then we always have something to do.”138 The normalizing practice of SLP is 
not bad but dangerous, and must always be approached critically.  
But most importantly for disabled people, a critical history allows us to question 
why dysfluency has so-often been excluded from our shared communicative practices, 
and in doing so allows us to imagine how speech, and therefore speaking people, might 
enter and habitate the world otherwise. The biopolitics of speech show modern 
communication to be at core a problem—a problem of blockage, leakage, breakdown, and 
solipsism. If, as is increasingly believed from the nineteenth-century onward, 
communication is welded to progress and social cohesion,139 what is dysfluency but a 
threat to common meanings, economic development, and national unity? Indeed, in 
1926 Charles Judd, an influential social and educational psychologist, argued that 
communication is a crucial national institution that gradually assimilates mind to mind 
and thus establishes social solidarity,140 a point quickly reiterated (1929) by the Iowa 
Child Research Station in relation to disabled speech. The disabled speaker literally 
embodies the problem of communication, disclosing in dramatic form its impossibility 
yet seeming necessity. Under the constant threat of epistemic blockage and breakdown, 
dysfluency is nothing but a threat, a risk, entropy.  
Yet what might happen in a world that regards communication not as a technical 
operation but an ethical relation? Rather than a wire strung tenuously between minds, 
might communication be a shared practice of codependent care and attention to bodies 
and meanings birthed together? The communication theorist John Durham Peters 
suggests that “thoughts derive their meaning from the ‘history of the body’; they need a 
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gestation.”141 If so, then perhaps the very crookedness of the dysfluent body, a body that 
ambles sideways leaning on others, can produce thick and multiple meanings. Perhaps 
we need dysfluent voices to rethink communication as a collaborative and crip effort. 
Questioning the social milieu and practices that have for over a century reified a frantic, 
ableist, and technocratic view of communication allows us not simply to challenge the 
discursive authority of SLP, but to imagine new possibilities opened by dysfluent voices.  
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